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Privacy in Early Confucian and Taoist 
Thought 
Christina B. Whitman 
"Privacy" is a term that eludes definition, 1 perhaps because it has been 
used to encompass so much of what Western liberal thought finds essential to 
human dignity. 2 Most vaguely stated, it refers to certain aspects of"the right 
to be left alone, "3 although it is not coextensive with that phrase. 4 In order to 
clarify the inquiry of this paper into the value of privacy in Confucian and 
Taoist thought, I shall begin by distinguishing among several possible 
approaches. 
(1) At one level, "privacy" is merely descriptive. It distinguishes between 
what is open or overt and what is concealed. The existence of the concept of 
privacy in this sense is a subject for sociologists and anthropologists-those 
who study manners, living conditions, and taboos concerning body parts and 
sexual activities. In another neutral usage, "privacy" distinguishes family life 
from "public" life. 5 The latter is the sphere of culture and politics; the former, 
the sphere which tends to the necessities of survival. "Privacy" in these neutral, 
descriptive senses can be found to some degree in all cultures. 6 
(2) "Privacy" may represent a claim of right-for example, a right to be 
free from certain government actions or a right to government protection 
from private actors. Whether premodern Chinese thought accommodates or 
supports such claims of right will not be of primary concern here. 
(3) Related to but distinct from the question of claims of right is the 
question whether a concept of "privacy" as valuable or desirable exists in 
traditional China. The subject of my inquiry is privacy as a value, rather than 
privacy as a claim of right. Do early Confucians and Taoists view privacy as 
worthy of emulation? I put to one side for the moment the question whether 
this value, if it does exist, is seen as supporting a claim against the government 
for protection or for forbearance from action. 
Only three aspects of the broad concept "privacy" will be explored in this 
essay: privacy as providing a sphere for intimate personal relationships with 
family and friends, privacy as freedom from surveillance for purposes of 
gathering personal information, and privacy as freedom from interference by 
government or social controls. These concepts describe quite different 
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concerns. They are often grouped together under the single term "privacy," 
but not without some strain. 7 
Because "privacy" takes a variety of forms in Western thought, it is not 
surprising that there is no perfectly parallel concept in classical Chinese 
writings. It is more interesting to ask whether there are Chinese counterparts 
to the more specific formulations of the terms, and whether early Chinese 
schools of thought cherish values that are inconsistent with the development 
of an appreciation of privacy comparable to that now found in the West. 
Our own concern with privacy, or at least our urgency in defense of the 
concept, is in large part a twentieth-century phenomenon. In the United 
States, privacy has achieved independent status as a legal right only in the last 
eighty years, 8 and its position is far from secure. 9 The recent increase in 
attention to privacy in America can be attributed to the development of new 
means of intruding into people's lives: modern technology permits 
surveillance without detection on a scale that was previously inconceivable, 
the mass media compete for audiences by trafficking in information about the 
personal foibles and intimate relationships of prominent individuals, and the 
behavioral sciences give academic respectability to inquiries into the most 
mundane habits of ordinary people. It can also be argued that privacy is taken 
more seriously now because it is more attainable in a modern, industrial 
society than at any other stage in human history. People no longer need live 
out their lives in a small community with a long memory. Mobility and 
urbanization permit anonymity, which, in turn, guarantees a certain amount 
of privacy. 
A comparison between a modern Western value and its counterpart, if 
any, in very early Confucian and Taoist belief is inevitably somewhat strained. 
But it serves a purpose. If nothing else, it helps us to define what is unique 
about our own views, thereby keeping us from assuming that our talk about 
privacy refers to some universally shared, thus necessarily correct, human 
value. 
A comparison across cultures and across centuries reveals that even 
twentieth-century articulations of the value of privacy draw on assumptions 
about human nature and the relationship of the individual to society that go 
beyond modern innovations. In many respects, our concern with privacy 
reflects values that exist in earlier Western thought and that have counterparts 
in premodern China. Many, maybe most, of the activities that lead us to 
esteem privacy and the "private" life were also of greatest importance in early 
China-family, friends, self-development, introspection. Indeed, there may 
be more that joins us than distinguishes us. 
But there is one characteristic of our current approach that is inconsistent 
with early Confucian and Taoist perspectives, though not with all Chinese 
thought. That characteristic is the tie between the value of privacy and certain 
notions of human autonomy. In particular, our twentieth-century devotion to 
privacy reflects our modern belief that a human being is fully autonomous 
only if he is free to discover what is distinctive about himself as an individual. 
This goes beyond choice of a unique life-style. Rather, it reflects one strain in 
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Western thought of the last two centuries that holds that man understands 
himself best when he sees himself as separate from other men. This is not a 
universally accepted view, even in twentieth-century America; indeed, we are 
deeply ambivalent about both the theory and its manifestation in arguments 
for privacy. 
In summary, we value privacy because it permits each person to discover 
and develop what is unique about himself. Our notion of privacy allows the 
individual to stand apart from all others. Confucians and Taoists do not give 
the goal equal emphasis. They, too, value intimate relationships and self-
discovery, but the reasons behind these values are inconsistent with our 
emphasis on individual uniqueness. 
Linguistic Analogues 
Although there is not, as I have suggested above, any neat analogue to the 
broad term "privacy" in the classical texts of Confucianism and Taoism, there 
are usages reminiscent of that concept. 
Some of these are neutral, descriptive usages. The context, rather than the 
concept, provides negative or positive value. Yin (to hide, put aside, or cover) 
is used in that sense in the Analects: "The Master said, 'My followers, I know 
you believe that I am hiding something from you. I am hiding nothing from 
you"' (yi wo wei yin hu, wu wu yin huerh). 10 And in the Chung-yung: "[Shun] 
loved to question others and to ponder their words .... He put aside [yin] what 
was error in them and made much of what was good. " 11 But yin is also used in 
the Analects to refer to an inappropriate secretiveness: "There are three errors 
which may be made in service to a gentleman. One may speak before his turn; 
this is called tsao. One may not speak when one's turn comes; this is called 
yin ... . "12 
Szu comes closest to signifying "privacy" in theW estern sense. Although it 
most often has unfavorable connotations (among its meanings are "adultery," 
"male/ female sex organs," and "urine"), it can also be used in a neutral way. 
For example, szu signifies family, as opposed to communal, ownership in 
Mencius's description of the well-field system: "The public fields are in the 
center, and eight families each have one hundred mu for their own use" (pa-
chia chieh szu pai-mu). 13 Mencius also uses szu to refer to unauthorized, and 
thus improper, actions: 
Suppose there were an officer here, with whom you were pleased, and 
suppose that without telling the king, all on your own [szu], you gave him 
your salary and your rank, and suppose that the officer, also without the 
king's command and all on his own [szu], passed them on to his son-
would this be permissible? 14 
Szu is often used to refer to the pursuit of private interests and, in this 
sense, implies selfishness. Both Mencius and Hstin Tzu, although they 
disagree fundamentally about the basic goodness of human nature, disparage 
conduct of this sort and argue that the external environment should not be 
structured in such a way as to drive men to pursue private interests at the 
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expense of society as a whole. Lao Tzu also condemns the pursuit of szu, 
although he is, as is his wont, more ironic: "Is it not precisely because he does 
not pursue personal ends that the sage can achieve his personal ends?" (jei i 
ch'i wu szu yeh, ku neng ch'eng ch'i szu). 15 And, "[Let the people] regard 
simplicity and hold fast to the uncarved block, let them have few personal ends 
[shao szu] and little desire. " 16 
Szu is primarily a negative concept in both Confucian and Taoist texts, but 
there are other concepts that are akin to "privacy" and yet are regarded more 
positively. Confucius looks favorably on concealment when it reflects family 
loyalties, even at the expense of the state: 
The Duke of She said to Confucius, "Among our people there are men 
who are upright. If their father has stolen a sheep, they will report him." 
Confucius said, "Among my people those who are upright are not like 
that. A father will conceal [yin] his son's wrongdoing, and a son will 
conceal [yin] his father's wrongdoing. Their uprightness lies in this." 17 
And Confucius urges withdrawal from public life in calamitous times: "When 
the Way does not prevail, then hide [yin]." 18 
Of greater significance is the Confucian emphasis on introspection (nei-
hsing) as one means of self-cultivation: "When you see a worthy man, emulate 
him. When you see one who is not worthy, then look within"(nei tzu-hsing). 19 
"If when he looks within [nei-hsing] he finds no blemish, why should he be 
anxious, why should he fear?"20 "If your goals are not achieved, you should 
always turn within to seek the cause within yourself. "21 "Therefore the 
superior man examines his own heart [ nei-hsing] to see that there is no blemish 
there. "22 
The Taoists also stress the virtues of inwardness and of things concealed. 
The first line of the Tao-te ching is "The Tao that can be described is not the 
constant Tao. "There is also: "The Tao is hidden [yin] and has no name"; 23 and 
"Therefore the sage knows himself and does not reveal himself' (pu tzu-
hsien). 24 
Reserve and withdrawal, and even the keeping of confidences, are valued 
in these texts, but, as we shall see, these references do not form a coherent 
concept precisely analogous to our "privacy." The discrepancy arises from 
different views about the ends to be served by introspection and withdrawal 
from public life. In Confucian and Taoist thought, the ultimate purpose is 
union of the individual with something greater-the natural ordering of men 
and nature, in Confucianism; or the all-encompassing Tao, in Taoism. In 
contemporary Western thought, withdrawal is prized primarily because it 
allows the individual to define himself as unique, distinctive, and 
autonomous. 
Privacy for Intimate Relationships 
The first form of privacy that I will discuss is privacy for family and 
friendship. Privacy of this sort is defended as providing a necessary context 
for intimate relationships, for the building of personal bonds. 25 Privacy is said 
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to be valued because it allows people the freedom to define these relationships 
in ways that suit their own needs, relatively immune from social constraints. 26 
Privacy permits relaxation and thus a certain degree of freedom from the 
burden of others' expectations. It also allows individuals to choose to expose 
themselves to different degrees with different people, creating a range of more 
or less intimate relationships. 
Family and friends are of immense importance in China, as everywhere. 
The central role of the family in Confucianism gives it far greater doctrinal 
importance than it has in most Western systems of thought, and friendship is 
given even greater importance in Confucian poetic texts. Even Taoist poets 
mourn the loneliness of a reclusive life: "Those who have left I cannot reach. 
For those who will come I cannot stay. "27 "Where is my friend, now kept from 
me by mountains and hills?"28 
Yet, Confucian and Taoist thinkers articulate reasons for valuing these 
personal relationships that are quite unlike the pursuit of intimacy, self-
definition, and freedom of development that is at the core of the Western 
theory of privacy. The Confucian articulation and, in a different way, the 
Taoist articulation are inconsistent with our belief that even an ideal state 
must leave a space for an intimate side oflife, shared with family and friends. 
This belief is based on the conclusion that only such an entirely separate 
sphere can serve the nonpublic needs that are a part of every human being. 
In early Confucian thought, family life is not seen as providing an 
opportunity for special ties unlike any experienced elsewhere. Instead, it is 
said to replicate natural hierarchies that ideally dictate all human 
organization, including the bond of a citizen to his ruler. The family is a model 
for relationships between individuals and the state. The Ta-hsiieh [The great 
learning] provides one of the most explicit expres~ions of the family's place as 
a basic unit of the political structure: 
[The ancient sages] who wished to govern well their states would first 
bring order to their families. 29 
What is meant by "To govern well one's state one must first bring order to 
one's family" is: there has never been a man who could not instruct his 
family but could instruct the people. Therefore, the superior man achieves 
instruction for his own state without going beyond his own family. 30 
The theme in these selections is that modes of conduct appropriate for the 
family life are also those appropriate to politics and rule. The ruler should 
treat his subjects as a father would his sons, and a child's feelings toward his 
parents mirror those of the subject to his ruler. The state is thought of as a 
large family, and relations among family members are not different in kind 
from political relationships. This suggests that compassion and care should 
play a significant role in political life, but it also suggests that intimacy is not 
the predominant aspect of family life. 
Therefore, family life does not exist in a completely separate sphere. There 
is a distinction between family life (nez) and the public life of the world ( wal), 
but the rules governing these areas overlap. Through his ties to his family, the 
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individual, at least in theory, cannot draw totally apart, leaving the rest of the 
world behind. Instead, he learns and affirms his social nature and his social 
role. In instructing King Hsiian of Ch'i, Mencius described the extension of 
family feeling to all mankind: 
The Book of Poetry says: 
He was a model to his wife, 
And to his elder and younger brothers. 
With this he governed his home and his nation. 
This means that you should extend your affections to all these others. 
Therefore, if you put forth your natural warmth, that will be sufficient to 
protect all within the four seas. 31 
The mutual support of loyalties between family and state, with the ruler as 
the ultimate father, did not always work in practice as it was described in 
theory. Family feeling could become so strong that it would interfere with 
political obligations. Confucius's example, quoted above, of the "upright" 
sons who protect their thieving fathers suggests that it might have been 
regarded as most honorable to put family affections before loyalty to the state. 
Legal codes from the Han dynasty on tolerated family loyalties at the expense 
of the state. In practice, we have reason to believe, men found it easier to 
identify with family and village than with the more remote government of the 
ruler. The family, then, could serve as a refuge into which the individual could 
withdraw from a hostile world. But this was seen as the "negative" aspect of 
family life. It remains significant that this strong sense offamily bonding was 
justified in most early Confucian texts, not because it is natural and necessary 
for groups of people to set themselves off from society, but because these 
bonds could, and should, serve as a means of drawing people of all families 
toward each other in a natural social hierarchy, universally accepted because 
it reflects universal family experiences. 
There is an additional respect in which the Confucian view of personal 
relationships appears to be inconsistent with our expectations of the ends to 
be served by privacy for intimate relationships. As I have indicated above, an 
argument made in support of this form of privacy is that it allows an 
individual to structure each relationship in a different fashion. That is, privacy 
provides the conditions for developing relationships of varying degrees of 
intimacy. It allows a person to use the disclosure of personal information as a 
way to increase intimacy. As intimacy deepens, the people involved come 
closer together by revealing more of themselves. Privacy permits one person 
to have a range of relationships-from relatively impersonal business 
relationships, in which little personal information is shared, to the extreme 
intimacy of marriage and enduring friendship. Theoretically, the latter are 
most free of the constraints created by abstract concepts of role because the 
unique qualities of the individuals involved are most revealed. 
In short, privacy permits variety and deviation from social expectations. 
Noninterference, at least theoretically, allows friendships and family roles to 
develop in an open-ended fashion. Western realities may depart from theory 
as much as Chinese realities. In practice, many intimate relationships in our 
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own society follow set patterns decreed by societal expectations which have 
been assimilated by the individuals involved. But when we focus on ideals, the 
contrast with Confucianism is marked. The early Confucian texts do not 
interpret family life as open-ended. Instead, society-including the family-is 
seen as functioning in quite specific patterns that are understood to be 
universal because they are innate in human nature. It is precisely because these 
patterns are thought to exist in every family group that the family can be used 
as a model for the organization of the state. There is little, if any, expectation 
of individual variation. 
Early Taoism places no comparable emphasis on family and social bonds. 
Indeed, such ties are regarded as reflecting distinctions and discriminations 
that are inconsistent with a real understanding of the unitary Tao. Lao Tzu 
and Chuang Tzu valued solitude above all else. The closest analogue in Taoist 
thought to familial or friendship privacy is found, not in these texts, but in the 
more poetic and less philosophical manifestations of Taoism. In the latter 
group of texts there is an acknowledgement of the importance of friendship, 
and in this acknowledgement, as in some Confucian poems, friendship is 
portrayed as a preferable alternative to conventional, public society. 
Friendship allows withdrawal. The Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove, a 
group of eccentrics who lived in the tumultuous third century A.D., are one 
obvious manifestation of this perspective. 
But this vision of friendship, like the Confucian understanding of the 
family, remains basically inconsistent with our theory of privacy for the sake 
of intimacy. First, in Taoism, as in Confucianism, withdrawing with a group 
of intimates is not regarded as an inevitable human response of the sort that 
would be appropriate, even necessary, in a properly functioning society. 
Instead, withdrawal is regarded as a means of survival, an unfortunate 
necessity in troubled times. Again, the Seven Sages provide a useful example. 
They lived in a time when men who took positions of prominence lived 
precariously. Avoidance of social ties and obligations was a means of self-
preservation, and those who took this avenue were understood to risk great 
loneliness. 32 Thus, survival, rather than intimacy, is the primary justification 
for this version of Taoist withdrawal. 
Second, the form that "withdrawal" from society took among N eo-Taoists 
in the time of the Seven Sages does not really have much to do with privacy at 
all. Instead, these men survived (to the extent that they were successful) by 
becoming eccentrics and exhibitionists. One of them, Liu Ling, was known for 
wandering nude about his house. He always traveled with a servant who 
carried a flask, for drinking, and a shovel, which could be used, if necessary, to 
dig Liu's grave. This was not a man who craved privacy. 
Third, and most significant, to the extent that Taoist withdrawal is not an 
aberrant manifestation but is rooted in classical Taoist doctrine, it represents 
a turning away from society for union with something (the Tao) that goes 
beyond the transitory ties of friendship. Submerging one's self in the Tao is 
tied to the quest for survival, for, it is argued, the only way to defeat the fear of 
death is to forego one's attachment to life. Friendship, then, is not valued as an 
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end in itself; far less is it seen primarily as a route by which an individual can 
discover and define his uniqueness. The ultimate goal is to rise above 
attachment-attachment to one's own uniqueness and attachment to one's 
friends-and to understand that all are part of the single Tao: "A man with 
special attachments is not a man oflove. "33 As a man comes to understand the 
Tao, he becomes more truly himself and, Chuang Tzu at least would 
emphasize, he comes to appreciate his individuality within this wholeness. 
Communion with the Tao is not conformity. Yet, it is significant that one's 
true self, one's individuality, can be best understood only through attention to 
that which is in all things. 
In conclusion, both early Confucianism and early Taoism value intimate 
relationships, but the ultimate goal in both philosophies is to rise above 
particular human ties to achieve a greater union-be it with all men in a 
society ordered according to the patterns innate to human nature or with the 
Tao. Neither school conceives of friendship and family life as a self-contained 
part of life, distinct from all other activities but essential as an avenue for 
personal growth. In Confucian thought, this area of life is not separate. In 
Taoism, a separate realm would not be necessary in an ideal state, for an 
individual need not withdraw to be part of the Tao. Indeed, one who has 
achieved perfect understanding of the Tao would not make the sorts of 
discriminations that form the basis of personal achievements. 
Yet, it is with respect to this form of privacy that we come closest to early 
China, for this privacy for intimate relationships is privacy at its most "social." 
By definition it involves relationships among people. Freedom from 
surveillance and freedom from social control, which I will discuss next, 
emphasize instead the self-sufficient autonomy of each individual. This is not 
to say that autonomy, in the sense of self-fulfillment and freedom from 
constraint, is irrelevant to familial and friendship privacy. Individual 
autonomy can be exercised through one's choice of friends and in one's free 
adoption of a particular family role. Early Confucianism and Taoism also 
recognize that people play many roles. The difference lies in the ultimate goal 
understood to be furthered through these roles. In the Chinese philosophies, 
the goal is union, not uniqueness. 
Freedom from Surveillance 
Another common understanding of privacy is freedom from observation 
or surveillance. Typically this refers to protection from efforts to gather 
information about hidden aspects of an individual's life. Privacy in this sense 
is valued, again, because it promotes autonomy. Privacy allows for self-
definition, choice of behavior, and expression free of social pressures. Privacy 
leaves room for nonenforcement of social norms-as, for example, those 
concerning aberrant sexual conduct. To some extent, the call for privacy in 
this sense reflects the post-Freudian belief that certain human characteristics 
are beyond the control of society and thus not properly of concern to 
institutions that could impose sanctions. There is, of course, an overlap with 
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privacy for intimate relationships; one aspect of such privacy is the right to be 
free from observation while with friends and family. 
Although much of the current concern with surveillance is uniquely 
modern, caused by new techniques for monitoring and collecting data on 
people's activities, this concern does rest on more broadly applicable views 
about the proper ends of government and society's capacity to affect behavior. 
These views are inconsistent with certain core assumptions of Confucianism 
and Taoism. 
Confucianism and, to a lesser extent, Taoism are primarily concerned with 
the role of government as a moral influence on individual behavior. That 
emphasis entails two assumptions-that a certain degree of moral consensus 
is possible and that society can play a significant role in guiding an individual's 
moral life. The form which this guidance takes differs profoundly between the 
two schools of thought. In Taoism, as we shall see, it looks more like 
nonguidance. 
Confucian ideology stresses an ordered society, built on a system of 
parallel hierarchies, which guides man through moral example toward correct 
attitudes and correct behavior. Given this framework, the idea of a separation 
between things properly of government concern and those of no concern to 
anyone but the individual is unintelligible. The implications of this perspective 
can best be seen in the debate between the early Confucians and the Legalists. 
The Legalists urged the establishment of clear "legal" rules of behavior and 
were, by implication, willing to tolerate some "private" areas which would not 
be addressed by these rules or at least not observed by the enforcers. The 
Confucians rejected the Legalist position precisely because it left some areas 
free. Persuasion was preferred to compulsion as a means of regulating 
behavior-not because it would leave more room for deviance from social 
norms, but because it would result in more consistent conformity. Persuaded 
men conform even when the enforcer is not around, while law controls only 
through fear of sanction. 
Therefore the superior man will watch himself when he is alone. But the 
small man-when he is alone and idle he will do evil without limit. Only 
when he sees a superior man does he try to hide his misdeeds. 34 
Thus, Confucian views are inconsistent with the belief that freedom from 
government surveillance is desirable. This is not to say that surveillance itself 
is considered to be a good thing. On the contrary, it is viewed as ineffective, 
and a decreased reliance on legal sanctions may lead to less surveillance in 
fact. But Confucianism is willing to tolerate, indeed advocates, the pervasive, 
all-encompassing degree of social control that is abhorrent to the opponents 
of surveillance. Moral education replaces law for the Confucians because they 
are willing to accept a state ideology that dictates all significant aspects of 
human conduct; this ideology is acceptable because it is believed to reflect 
moral dictates also found in each individual, i.e., it is natural. Confucians are 
willing to say that, if the state is running properly, there need be no room for 
individual moral choices that differ from those made by society. An 
94 Christina Whitman 
interesting example of the difference between Confucian and Western 
perspectives on this point can be found in their respective attitudes toward 
criminal confessions. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself." In part, this is justified as a privacy right-the right 
to refuse to aid the government in obtaining information against one's self. 
Such freedom from self-incrimination is not acknowledged in China, where 
confessions have been encouraged, at least since the T'ang dynasty, by 
reductions of punishment. The Ch'ing-dynasty code even permits the use of 
torture to extract confessions of guilt. 
Taoism, unlike Confucianism, does not contemplate the achievement of a 
moral consensus. Chuang Tzu sees no role for government at all, and Lao Tzu, 
who does, explicitly values noninterference. In Lao Tzu's view, failure to 
govern is the ideal form of government and the form most likely to be 
successful: "Through nonaction lay hold of all under heaven. "35 As in 
Confucianism, the ruler guides his people, but he guides them toward 
nonaction by being himself a model of nonaction. 
At first glance, this may look like an argument for freedom from 
government surveillance, and it is. But it is not an argument for privacy of the 
sort that we are familiar with. Lao Tzu does not contemplate that freedom 
from observation will allow room for the development, on the part of each 
human, of a unique sense of self. The advantage of noninterference for him is 
that it furthers the elimination of distinctions among individuals. My 
explication of the third form of the value of privacy will help to clarify this 
point. 
Freedom from Control 
Privacy, defined most broadly, is freedom from social control-that is, 
freedom from interference by the state, other institutions, or other people. The 
two forms of priv~cy discussed above are more specific subsets of this 
generalized value. 
Privacy as freedom from social control is valued because we see it as 
essential to the individual uniqueness which we understand to be essential to 
moral autonomy. Privacy permits individuals to think and do as they please-
to develop their own "true," and "unique," personalities. Our insistence that 
uniqueness is essential to autonomy assumes that individuals can and should 
exercise moral choice in a variety of different ways (or that no society can be 
sure of the proper moral choice) and that personal development should be 
guided by these choices rather than by what we consider to be externally 
imposed roles and expectations. 
Autonomy of this sort need not be equivalent to selfishness, or the pursuit 
of private gain, for an individual may choose to pursue ends that go beyond 
his own interests, or even beyond those of a narrowly defined group, such as 
his family. But this view does focus on the individual at the expense of the 
overall functioning of society: "autonomy" emphasizes the development of 
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personal character, especially the unique qualities and aptitudes of each 
individual. A view premised on moral autonomy is willing to tolerate, in 
pursuing that goal, departure from social norms. 
There is much in early Confucianism and Taoism that is resonant of this 
view. A key Confucian concept is the cultivation of the self, and this 
cultivation takes place, in part, through introspection. The goal of self-
cultivation is often described as a state of tranquility. Tranquility implies a 
lack of external interference. Mencius, for instance, gives instructions on 
"remaining unmoved in one's mind" (pu:tung hsin), free from biases and fears 
generated by the world in which man lives. The Ta-hsiieh also preaches 
tranquility, a state made possible by the moral knowledge that is arrived at 
through introspection: "Only when you know where to rest can you be calm. 
Only when you are calm can you be quiet. Only when you are quiet can you be 
at peace. Only when you are at peace can you be thoughtful. Only when you 
are thoughtful can you achieve the end. "36 The Taoists, too, seek tranquility. 
Chuang Tzu talks of freeing the mind and achieving a tranquil state: 
Yen Hui replied, "I cast away my arms and legs. I dismiss my wisdom. I 
separate myself from my body and get rid of my mind, to become one with 
the great Tao. This is called sitting and forgetting. "37 
The perfect man uses his mind like a mirror. He neither grabs nor 
welcomes. 38 
Although a common symbol of Neo-Taoism is the hermit (yin-che) who 
has cut himself off from the world, neither Chuang Tzu nor the Confucians are 
talking about physical withdrawal. For Chuang Tzu, "tranquility" is, rather, 
adaptation to all that comes. For the Confucians, it comes from, among other 
things, understanding one's natural role in the world. 
In Taoism, as I noted above, the emphasis on adaptation leads to the 
argument that a wise ruler (who will, by definition, also be a sage) is tolerant 
and does not interfere: 
Therefore it is said that the ancients who tended the empire had no desires 
and the empire was complete. They did not act and all things were 
transformed. They were deep and quiet and all the people were calm. 39 
In the Tao-te-ching, this sort of rule is advocated because it leads to a peaceful, 
if somewhat boring, society: "The neighboring state is so very close that they 
could hear the sounds of each others' cocks and dogs, but the people would 
grow old and die without having gone there. "40 Noninterference, in Lao Tzu's 
view. is a device for social control. In Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, there is a 
suggestion, more familiar to Western proponents of privacy, that 
noninterference will lead to vigor and variety: "To treat things that are 
different as if they were the same is to be great. To act without limiting one's 
uniqueness is to be broad. To be many without being the same is to be rich. "41 
Thus, we find in early Confucianism and Taoism: ( 1) a strong emphasis on 
self-development; (2) arguments for nonaction, noninterference, or tolerance; 
and (3) a suggestion, in Chuang Tzu, that this is appropriate because it allows 
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variety to flourish. The first point is particularly important because it suggests 
that some value is placed on the moral autonomy of the individual. Indeed, 
both Confucianism and Taoism contemplate that there will be times when the 
good man will not support the state. However, it is significant that neither 
philosophy contemplates that such opposition will be necessary or 
appropriate in an ideal state. In a properly ordered state, the knowledge and 
personal growth that come through introspection will still be necessary, but 
they will bring the individual into harmony with his social environment. 
Confucianism and Taoism appreciate that men have a rich internal life, 
but this does not, in these philosophies, lead to the conclusion that society 
must permit a private sphere for individual development free from social 
control. The attention in China to self-cultivation does not reflect a judgment 
that the cultivation process is ultimately valuable because it permits 
deviations from social norms and allows each individual to develop distinctive 
values and beliefs. Self-determination in this sense, with emphasis on what is 
unique rather than on what is shared, is not the end to be achieved. This is of 
critical importance, for freedom from interference without the expectation 
that people, when left to themselves, will go different ways, is not what we 
mean when we talk about "privacy." 
I will elaborate on this point, first in terms of Confucianism. Through 
introspection, the Confucians hold, the individual comes to understand 
ethical ideas, but these ideas are defined in terms of social relationships. 
Autonomy is valued, but men acting autonomously are expected to discover 
what is shared rather than what is unique. The end of self-cultivation is to 
understand natural hierarchies and to appreciate one's proper place in these 
hierarchies. Understanding, although achieved by looking within, makes the 
individual aware of what he has in common with other men. Every man, it is 
believed, finds the same feelings, the same moral imperatives, and the same 
impetus toward proper conduct. There is no sharp division between what an 
individual thinks and does in public and what he thinks and does in private. 
Cultivation of the self illuminates both public and private roles. The proper 
result is not deviance, but conformity-conformity to the natural distinctions 
that pervade all of life. 
Moreover, the ultimate goal of self-cultivation, to a Confucian, is not 
private, but public: to take one's proper place in society, and to stand as a 
model for others. This is the route to a properly ordered world: 
Tzu-lu asked about the superior man. Confucius replied, "He trains 
himself to be reverent." Tzu-lu said, "Is that all?'' Confucius said, "He 
trains himself to bring peace to other men." Tzu-lu said, "Is that all?'' 
Confucius replied, "He trains himself to bring peace to all people. Even 
Yao and Shun could find no fault in that. "42 
In a sense, then, the early Confucians contemplate actual autonomy oflife-
style as well as moral autonomy. Where society does not accurately reflect the 
natural hierarchies, man will go his own way when he looks within. But in an 
ideal society, there is no distinction between what is accomplished by social 
control and what is accomplished by self-control. 
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The Taoists, on the other hand, in urging that men look for the "Tao 
within," do not expect that the contemplative will discover a natural 
hierarchy, or indeed, any natural distinctions. Nor do they expect that one 
who achieves realization will or can direct the insights of others. But there is 
still, as in Confucianism, an expectation that man, when left alone, will 
discover what is shared. The Taoist takes this even further than the Confucian, 
for the Taoist sage comes to understand that he is one with all things. The 
Confucian turns from private ends (szu) to understanding public distinctions. 
The Taoist turns from private ends to understanding that there are no 
distinctions. 
The Six Dynasties Taoist texts contemplate that the wise man will preserve 
himself by withdrawing. This emphasis on self-preservation, most explicit in 
poetic Taoism, does indicate a certain attention to private ends. But, as 
described in the philosophical texts, it is not a distinct human personality that 
is being preserved. Rather, escape from the vicissitudes of the world becomes 
possible when the sage realizes that his unique qualities, even his body, are 
unimportant: "The only reason why I suffer pain is that I have a body; if I had 
no body, what pain would I have?"43 What is important is the permanent and 
universal Tao, not its temporary manifestation in human beings. In an ideal 
society, the ruler-sage will leave his subjects alone. He will do this not because 
leaving them alone is a desirable thing in itself (the end of Taoism is the 
elimination of desire), but because it is the best way to help them find the Tao. 
In both early Confucianism and Taoism, freedom from interference is seen 
as necessary to personal development, but the goals of personal development 
are not open-ended and do not, ultimately, vary from person to person. The 
individual is led, instead, to something beyond himself which is shared by all 
men. This does not mean annihilation or loss of individuality. Rather, one 
becomes more truly one's self through understanding what is shared. In an 
ideal society, freedom from social control is not particularly important, for 
the ends of society and the ends of self-cultivation are identical. 
Conclusion 
There are certain concepts, valued by early Confucians and by Taoists, 
that might, at first glance, suggest that privacy as we understand it is perceived 
as desirable. These concepts include friendship, family bonds, noninter-
ference, self-cultivation, introspection, and withdrawal from society. But a 
closer look reveals that the end we in twentieth-century western society seek to 
advance by respecting privacy has no counterpart in early Confucian or Taoist 
thought. The key to this lack of fit lies in our view that privacy allows an 
individual to exercise free choice as part of a process of self-determination that 
has little to do with the larger world. Privacy of family and of friendship 
allows personal definition of intimate relationships. Freedom from 
observation provides room to experiment and to deviate from accepted 
behavior. Privacy that hinges on freedom from social control allows each 
individual to develop in a distinctive direction that best fits his unique 
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characteristics. These justifications reflect our view of the individual (we prize 
the unique) and our view of society as furthering the considered choices and 
the self-knowledge of distinctive individuals. It also explains the ambivalence 
and even confusion about privacy found in the West, for privacy, for us, is 
ultimately justified by a sort of radical selfishness. 
Early Confucian texts do not balk at pressures to conform because they 
accept the existence and desirability of pervasive social norms. Privacy merely 
hinders the achievement of the ideal society when it gives room for 
nonenforcement of norms or the development of peculiar, and thus irrelevant, 
characteristics. Little value is placed on a unique sense of self. What a man 
learns when he looks within brings him back to society. 
Taoism initially appears to be more receptive to the theory of privacy, for 
it talks of tolerance and opposes conformity. However, the goal in Taoism, 
too, is to find what is common to all men. The Taoists differ from the 
Confucians in rejecting the necessity of social norms and hierarchy. However, 
something other than the individual's own freely made choices-namely, the 
Tao that is in both the individual and all things-determines the direction of 
individual development. 
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